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Abstract. We provide a brief survey of some literature on intertemporal social choice
theory in a multi-profile setting. As is well-known, Arrow’s impossibility result hinges on
the assumption that the population is finite. For infinite populations, there exist non-
dictatorial social welfare functions satisfying Arrow’s axioms and they can be described
by their corresponding collections of decisive coalitions. We review contributions that
explore whether this possibility in the infinite-population context allows for a richer class
of social welfare functions in an intergenerational model. Different notions of stationarity
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1 Introduction
The conclusion of Arrow’s (1951; 1963; 2012) dictatorship theorem depends on the as-
sumption that the population under consideration is finite. This observation goes back
to Fishburn (1970). However, Hansson (1976, p. 89) points out (quoting correspondence
with Peter Fishburn) that Julian Blau was aware of the existence of non-dictatorial social
welfare functions in the infinite-population case as early as 1960 without publishing this
observation. Sen (1979) and Suzumura (2000) highlight the role played by the finiteness
assumption in their respective methods of proving Arrow’s theorem. Kirman and Sonder-
mann (1972) and Hansson (1976) cast a new light on the structure of an Arrovian social
welfare function with an infinite population, showing that the set of decisive coalitions for
a social welfare function that satisfies Arrow’s axioms of unlimited domain, weak Pareto
and independence of irrelevant alternatives forms an ultrafilter. Their analyses apply
to any (finite or infinite) population without any further structural assumptions. In an
important contribution, Ferejohn and Page (1978) endowed the infinite population social
choice model by adding an intertemporal component. Time flows only unidirectionally,
and any two distinct members of the society (or generations) are such that one generation
appears in the society after the other. As a result of introducing this time structure of
infinite population, Ferejohn and Page (1978) provide a new link between Arrow’s multi-
profile approach to social choice and the theory of evaluating infinite intergenerational
utility streams as initiated by Koopmans (1960) and Diamond (1965). In the Koopmans-
Diamond framework, the focus is on resource allocations among different generations with
a fixed utility function for each generation. Thus, multi-profile considerations do not arise
in this traditional setting.
Starting out with Hansson’s (1976) result on the ultrafilter structure of the set of
decisive coalitions, Ferejohn and Page (1978) propose a classical stationarity condition
in an infinite-horizon multi-profile social choice model and show that if a social welfare
function that satisfies their stationarity property in addition to Arrow’s conditions exists,
then generation one must be a dictator. Stationarity as defined by Ferejohn and Page
demands that if a common first-period alternative is eliminated from two infinite streams
of per-period alternatives, then the resulting continuation streams must be ranked in
the same way as the original streams according to the social ranking obtained for the
original profile. The reason why generation one is the only candidate for a dictator is
the conjunction of the unidirectional nature of the flow of time and the resulting bias in
favor of the first generation embodied in the stationarity property. Dictatorships of later
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generations cannot be stationary because we can only move forward but not backward in
time.
As Ferejohn and Page (1978) note themselves, the question whether such a social
welfare function exists is left open by their analysis; they show that, conditional on its
existence, a stationary social welfare function satisfying Arrow’s (1951; 1963; 2012) ax-
ioms must be dictatorial with generation one being the dictator. Packel (1980) resolved
the existence issue by establishing a strong impossibility result: no collective choice rule
that generates complete social rankings can satisfy unlimited domain, weak Pareto and
stationarity. Neither transitivity of the social preference relations nor independence of
irrelevant alternatives are needed for this result. Bossert and Suzumura (2011) prove a
slightly stronger version of Packel’s (1980) impossibility theorem by dropping complete-
ness of the social relations from the list of requirements. It is possible to obtain further
generalizations of this impossibility result. As is clear from its proof (which is provided
later in the paper), only a single preference profile is required and, as a consequence, any
domain that includes such a profile will produce the impossibility. For instance, Bossert
and Suzumura (2011) point out that the same conclusion holds if individual preferences
are restricted to those that are history-independent.
In the face of this rather strong impossibility result, a question arises naturally: what
modifications to the domain assumption or to the classical stationarity condition allow
us to obtain possibility results? Packel (1980) and Bossert and Suzumura (2011) choose
two different paths in order to resolve the impossibility.
Packel’s (1980) approach consists of restricting the domain of a social welfare function
to profiles where the individual preferences (or generation one’s preferences) are them-
selves stationary. This domain assumption, which is plausible if social preferences are
required to be stationary in Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) sense, allows for the existence of
social welfare functions that satisfy the remaining axioms.
Bossert and Suzumura (2011), on the other hand, consider an alternative domain
assumption—namely, the assumption that each generation’s preference relation is selfish
in the sense that it depends on the per-period outcome for this generation only. This self-
ish domain also allows for the existence of social welfare functions that satisfy weak Pareto
and classical stationarity. However, requiring independence of irrelevant alternatives or
Pareto indifference in addition again generates impossibilities. The impossibility result
involving independence does, as far as we are aware, not appear in the earlier literature.
In order to circumvent these new impossibilities, the selfish domain assumption is supple-
mented by a modification of the stationarity axiom. Especially in the context of selfish
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preferences, it seems natural to consider a suitable multi-profile version of stationarity.
Multi-profile stationarity requires that, for any two streams of per-period alternatives and
for any preference profile, if the first-period alternatives are the same in the two streams,
then the social ranking of the two streams according to this profile is the same as the
social ranking that results if the common first-period alternative is removed along with
the preference ordering of generation one. When combined, multi-profile stationarity and
selfish domain allow for social welfare functions that also satisfy weak Pareto, indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto indifference. Moreover, these properties can
be used to characterize the lexicographic dictatorship in which the generations are taken
into consideration in chronological order.
Both approaches—employing the classical stationary domain or the selfish domain—
allow for possibilities. However, the existence of a dictator (generation one) is implied
under either of the two domain assumptions. Thus, although the infinite-population
version of Arrow’s social choice problem permits, in principle, non-dictatorial rules, these
additional possibilities vanish in an intergenerational setting if the above-described notions
of stationarity are imposed.
In this paper, we provide a brief survey of multi-profile intergenerational social choice
as outlined above. After introducing the basic definitions, we provide a statement of
Hansson’s (1976) ultrafilter theorem which is used in several of the subsequent results.
This is followed by a discussion of the fundamental Ferejohn-Page (1978) theorem and
the impossibility established by Packel (1980) and generalized by Bossert and Suzumura
(2011). Then the two methods of modifying the domain or the stationarity axiom and
their consequences are reviewed and further possibility, impossibility and characterization
results are stated. This includes the new impossibility theorem involving selfish domains
and independence of irrelevant alternatives alluded to above.
We provide full proofs whenever they are based on elementary methods. Hansson’s
(1976) theorem is stated without a proof and we refer the reader to the original article
instead. Full proofs of results that rely on variants of the ultrafilter theorem are not given;
this is the case because these variants would themselves require proofs due to the different
domain assumptions employed. In these cases (to be precise, Packel’s (1980) possibility
result and Bossert and Suzumura’s (2011) characterization), however, the proof ideas are
outlined in some detail to explain the intuition underlying the respective result.
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2 Intergenerational social choice and decisiveness
Suppose there is a set of per-period alternatives X with |X| ≥ 3. Let X∞ be the set of
all infinite streams of per-period alternatives x = (x1, x2, . . .) where, for each generation
t ∈ N, xt ∈ X is the period-t alternative experienced by generation t.
The set of all binary relations on X∞ is denoted by B. An ordering is a reflexive,
complete and transitive relation and the set of all orderings on X∞ is denoted by R. The
asymmetric part and the symmetric part of a relation R are denoted by P (R) and I(R),
respectively. Furthermore, for all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ B, R|{x,y} is the restriction
of R to the set {x,y}.
The preference ordering of generation t ∈ N is Rt ∈ R. A (preference) profile is a
stream R = (R1, R2, . . .) of orderings on X
∞. The set of all such profiles is denoted by
R∞. Throughout the paper, we assume that individual preferences are orderings.
In the infinite-horizon context studied in this paper, a collective choice rule is a map-
ping f :D → B, where D ⊆ R∞ with D 6= ∅ is the domain of f . The interpretation is
that, for a profile R ∈ D, f(R) is the social ranking of streams in X∞. If f(R) is an
ordering for all R ∈ D, f is a social welfare function.
Arrow’s (1951; 1963; 2012) fundamental properties are an unlimited domain assump-
tion, the weak Pareto principle and independence of irrelevant alternatives. These axioms
are well-established and require no further discussion.
Unlimited domain. D = R∞.
Weak Pareto. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ D,
xP (Rt)y for all t ∈ N ⇒ xP (f(R))y.
Independence of irrelevant alternatives. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R,R′ ∈ D,
Rt|{x,y} = R′t|{x,y} for all t ∈ N ⇒ f(R)|{x,y} = f(R′)|{x,y} .
A set T ⊆ N is decisive for a social welfare function f if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X∞
and for all R ∈ D,
xP (Rt)y for all t ∈ T ⇒ xP (f(R))y.
Clearly, N is decisive for any social welfare function f that satisfies weak Pareto. If
there is a generation t ∈ N such that {t} is decisive for f , generation t is a dictator for f
and the social welfare function f is said to be dictatorial.
A filter on N is a collection F of subsets of N such that
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1. ∅ 6∈ F ;
2. N ∈ F ;
3. for all T, T ′ ∈ F , T ∩ T ′ ∈ F ;
4. for all T, T ′ ⊆ N, [[T ∈ F and T ⊆ T ′]⇒ T ′ ∈ F ].
An ultrafilter on N is a collection U of subsets of N such that
1. ∅ 6∈ U ;
2. for all T ⊆ N, [T ∈ U or N \ T ∈ U ];
3. for all T, T ′ ∈ U , T ∩ T ′ ∈ U .
The conjunction of properties 1 and 2 in the definition of an ultrafilter implies that N ∈ U
and, furthermore, the conjunction of properties 1 and 3 implies that the disjunction in
property 2 is exclusive—that is, T and N \ T cannot both be in U .
An ultrafilter U is principal if and only if there exists a t ∈ N such that, for all T ⊆ N,
T ∈ U if and only if t ∈ T . Otherwise, U is a free ultrafilter. It can be verified easily that
if N is replaced with a finite set, then the only ultrafilters are principal and, therefore,
Hansson’s theorem reformulated for finite populations reduces to Arrow’s (1951; 1963;
2012) theorem—that is, there exists an individual (or a generation) t which is a dictator.
In the infinite-population case, a set of decisive coalitions that is a principal ultrafilter
corresponds to a dictatorship just as in the finite case. Unlike in the finite case, there also
exist free ultrafilters but they cannot be defined explicitly; the proof of their existence
relies on non-constructive methods in the sense of using variants of the axiom of choice.
These free ultrafilters are non-dictatorial. However, social preferences associated with sets
of decisive coalitions that form free ultrafilters fail to be continuous with respect to most
standard topologies; see, for instance, Campbell (1990; 1992a,b).
Hansson (1976) shows that if a social welfare function f satisfies unlimited domain,
weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives, then the set of all decisive coali-
tions for f must be an ultrafilter. For future reference, we provide a statement of Hansson’s
(1976) theorem formulated in the intertemporal context and refer the reader to the orig-
inal paper for the proof of the more general result that applies to any population with at
least two members.
Theorem 1 (Hansson, 1976) If a social welfare function f satisfies unlimited domain,
weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives, then the set of all decisive coali-
tions for f is an ultrafilter.
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Hansson (1976) also shows that, for any ultrafilter U , there exists a social welfare function
f that satisfies unlimited domain, weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives
such that the set of decisive coalitions for f is equal to U . Moreover, he provides a parallel
analysis for situations where the transitivity requirement on social rankings is weakened
to quasi-transitivity. In this case, the resulting sets of decisive coalitions are filters rather
than ultrafilters; see Hansson (1976) for details.
3 Classical stationarity
Arrow’s (1951; 1963; 2012) axioms introduced in the previous section are well-known from
the relevant literature and require no further discussion. None of them, however, invoke
the intertemporal structure of our model. Classical stationarity introduced by Ferejohn
and Page (1978), in contrast, is based on the unidirectional nature of time. The underlying
idea is due to Koopmans (1960) in a related but distinct context: if two streams of per-
period alternatives agree in the first period, their relative social ranking is the same as
that of their respective period-two continuations. To formulate a property of this nature
in a multi-profile setting, the profile under consideration for each of the two comparisons
must be specified.
First, we introduce the definition of a stationary binary relation on X∞. Let t ∈ N.
For x ∈ X∞, the period-t continuation of x is
x≥t = (xt, xt+1, . . .),
that is, (x≥t)τ = xτ+t−1 for all τ ∈ N. Analogously, for R ∈ R∞, the period-t continuation
of R is
R≥t = (Rt, Rt+1, . . .).
A relation R on X∞ is stationary if and only if, for all x,y ∈ X∞, if x1 = y1, then
xRy ⇔ x≥2Ry≥2.
In Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) and Packel’s (1980) definitions of stationarity, the same
profile is employed before and after the common first-period alternative is removed. This
leads to the following axiom.
Classical stationarity. For all R ∈ D, f(R) is stationary.
Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) fundamental result establishes that if there exists a social
welfare function f that satisfies unlimited domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant
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alternatives and classical stationarity, then generation one must be a dictator for f . As
they clearly acknowledge, the existence issue itself remains unresolved by their theorem.
Theorem 2 (Ferejohn and Page, 1978) If a social welfare function f satisfies unlim-
ited domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and classical stationar-
ity, then generation one is a dictator for f .
Proof. The proof proceeds by showing that, given the axioms in the theorem statement,
{1} is decisive and, thus, generation one is a dictator for f .
By Theorem 1, the set of decisive coalitions is an ultrafilter. Let x, y ∈ X and let 
be an ordering on X such that
xP ()y.
Define the profile R as follows. Let, for all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all t ∈ N,
xRty ⇔ xt  yt.
Now consider the streams
x = (x, x, y, x, y, x, . . .);
y = (y, y, x, y, x, y, . . .);
z = (x, y, x, y, x, y, . . .) = x≥2 = w≥2;
w = (y, x, y, x, y, x, . . .) = z≥2 = y≥2.
We have wP (Rt)z for all even t ∈ N and zP (Rt)w for all odd t ∈ N. By definition of
an ultrafilter, either
{t ∈ N | t is even} is decisive (1)
or
{t ∈ N | t is odd} is decisive. (2)
If (1) is true, it follows that
wP (f(R))z. (3)
Because





w = y≥2 and z = w≥2 and (y≥2)1 = (w≥2)1 = y,
classical stationarity implies
yP (f(R))w. (5)
Using (5), (3) and (4), transitivity implies yP (f(R))x. But xP (Rt)y for all even t ∈ N
and, thus, we obtain a contradiction to the decisiveness of {t ∈ N | t is even}. Therefore,








z = w≥2 and w = y≥2 and (w≥2)1 = (y≥2)1 = y,
classical stationarity implies
wP (f(R))y. (8)
Using (7), (6) and (8), transitivity implies xP (f(R))y. We have
{t ∈ N | xP (Rt)y} = {1} ∪ {t ∈ N | t is even}
and, thus, the complement of this set cannot be decisive. Therefore,
{1} ∪ {t ∈ N | t is even}
is decisive and, by property 3 of an ultrafilter, it follows that
{1} = {t ∈ N | t is odd} ∩ ({1} ∪ {t ∈ N | t is even})
is decisive, and the proof is complete.
Packel (1980) answers the existence question left open by Ferejohn and Page (1978) in
the negative by showing that there does not exist any collective choice rule that generates
complete social rankings and satisfies unlimited domain, weak Pareto and classical sta-
tionarity. Bossert and Suzumura (2011) slightly strengthen Packel’s (1980) impossibility
result by dropping the completeness assumption.
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Theorem 3 (Packel, 1980; Bossert and Suzumura, 2011) There exists no collec-
tive choice rule f that satisfies unlimited domain, weak Pareto and classical stationarity.
Proof. Suppose f is a collective choice rule that satisfies the axioms of the theorem
statement. Let x, y ∈ X.
For each odd t ∈ N, let t be an antisymmetric ordering on X such that
yP (t)x.
For each even t ∈ N, let t be an antisymmetric ordering on X such that
xP (t)y.
Define a profile R as follows. For all x,y ∈ X∞, let
xP (R1)y ⇔ x1P (1)y1 or [x1 = y1 and x3P (1)y3].
Now let, for all x,y ∈ X∞,
xR1y ⇔ ¬yP (R1)x.
For all t ∈ N \ {1} and for all x,y ∈ X∞, let
xRty ⇔ xt t yt.
Now consider the streams
x = (x, x, y, x, y, x, . . .);
y = (x, y, x, y, x, y, . . .) = x≥2;
z = (y, x, y, x, y, x, . . .) = y≥2.
We have xP (Rt)y for all t ∈ N and, by weak Pareto, xP (f(R))y. Stationarity implies
yP (f(R))z. But zP (Rt)y for all t ∈ N, and we obtain a contradiction to weak Pareto.
The result established in the above theorem can be strengthened by restricting the domain.
Note that only a single profile is used in its proof and, thus, the impossibility remains
valid if the domain is restricted to any subset containing this specific profile. For instance,
Bossert and Suzumura (2011) phrase the result by using a forward-looking domain such
that each generation t compares any two streams exclusively on the basis of their period-t
continuations.
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Based on the observations of this section, there appear to be two natural ways to
proceed in order to arrive at possibility results.
The first of these, due to Packel (1980), is discussed in the following section. Packel
(1980) retains the classical stationarity assumption throughout his analysis. To resolve
the impossibility, he employs domains that only contain stationary individual preferences
(or domains that only include profiles in which generation one’s preference ordering must
be stationary and the orderings of all other generations may be arbitrary).
The second approach involves replacing classical stationarity with a multi-profile vari-
ant of stationarity and an alternative domain restriction due to Bossert and Suzumura
(2011). Multi-profile stationarity differs from classical stationarity in that not only com-
mon first-period outcomes are removed from two streams but also the preference ordering
of the first generation. Bossert and Suzumura also employ selfish domains, that is, do-
mains such that each generation’s preference ordering depends on this generation’s per-
period outcomes only. We illustrate the consequences of using multi-profile stationarity
in a setting with selfish domains in the final section of the paper.
4 Classical stationary domains
The classical stationary domain R∞C is composed of all profiles R ∈ R∞ such that Rt is
stationary for each t ∈ N. The resulting domain assumption is used by Packel (1980).
Classical stationary domain. D = R∞C .
Packel’s (1980) possibility result establishes that classical stationarity is compatible with
weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives on classical stationary domains
even if the collective choice rule is required to produce social orderings.
Theorem 4 (Packel, 1980) There exists a social welfare function f that satisfies clas-
sical stationary domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and classical
stationarity.
Proof. An example is sufficient to prove the theorem. Let, for all R ∈ R∞, f(R) = R1.
Because R1 is stationary by the domain assumption, it follows immediately that all the
axioms of the theorem statement are satisfied.
As is evident from Packel’s (1980, p. 223) formulation of the result, the possibility survives
if the domain is expanded by allowing the preference orderings of all generations other
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than generation one to be arbitrary; what matters is that generation one’s preferences are
stationary.
Although the above theorem provides a possibility result, the example invoked is not
very promising—it involves a dictatorship of generation one. Indeed, this is no coincidence;
as Packel (1980) shows, even if the domain is restricted so as to allow no preferences other
than stationary ones for all generations, generation-one dictatorships are the only social
welfare functions that satisfy weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and
classical stationarity. This observation is parallel to that of Ferejohn and Page (1978) but,
in the case of the following theorem, existence is not an issue as Theorem 4 illustrates.
Theorem 5 (Packel, 1980) If a social welfare function f satisfies classical stationary
domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and classical stationarity,
then generation one is a dictator for f .
Sketch of proof. The proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 2. However,
it is necessary to prove a variant of Hansson’s (1976) result (Theorem 1) that applies
to the classical stationary domain as opposed to the unlimited domain. Once this is
accomplished, the remaining steps parallel those employed in the proof of Theorem 2.
5 Selfish domains and multi-profile stationarity
The selfish domain R∞S is obtained by letting, for all R ∈ R∞, R ∈ R∞S if and only if,
for each t ∈ N, there exists an ordering t on X such that, for all x,y ∈ X∞,
xRty ⇔ xt t yt.
Selfish domain. D = R∞S .
As an alternative to Theorem 4, we can replace unlimited domain with selfish domain
instead of classical stationary domain in order to obtain a possibility result.
Theorem 6 (Bossert and Suzumura, 2011) There exists a social welfare function f
that satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto and classical stationarity.
Proof. Again, an example is sufficient to prove this theorem. Suppose (1,2, . . .) is
the profile of orderings on X associated with the selfish profile R ∈ R∞S of orderings on
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X∞. Define a social welfare function f by letting, for all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ R∞S ,
xf(R)y if and only if
[xτI(1)yτ for all τ ∈ N] or
[there exists t ∈ N such that xτI(1)yτ for all τ < t and xtP (1)yt].
This social welfare function satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto and classical stationarity.
Unlike Theorem 4, Theorem 6 does not include independence of irrelevant alternatives as
one of the axioms that can be satisfied under the alternative domain assumption. In fact,
adding the independence property to the list of axioms leads to another impossibility.
This is a new observation that, to the best of our knowledge, does not appear in the
previous literature.
Theorem 7 There exists no collective choice rule f that satisfies selfish domain, weak
Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and classical stationarity.
Proof. Suppose f is a collective choice rule that satisfies the axioms of the theorem
statement. Let x, y, z ∈ X.
For each t ∈ N, let t be an ordering on X such that
yP (t)x and xP (t)z.
Furthermore, for each odd t ∈ N, let ′t be an ordering on X such that
yP (′t)z and zP (′t)x.
Finally, for each even t ∈ N, let ′t be an ordering on X such that
xP (′t)y and yP (′t)z.
Define two profiles R and R′ as follows. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all t ∈ N, let
xRty ⇔ xt t yt
and
xR′ty ⇔ xt ′t yt.
Clearly, the profiles thus defined are in R∞S .
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Now consider the streams
x = (z, x, y, x, y, x, y, . . .);
y = (z, z, x, z, x, z, x, . . .);
z = (x, y, x, y, x, y, x, . . .) = x≥2;
w = (z, x, y, x, y, x, y, . . .) = y≥2.
We have zP (Rt)w for all t ∈ N and, by weak Pareto, zP (f(R))w. Stationarity implies
xP (f(R))y. (9)
Furthermore, wP (R′t)z for all t ∈ N and, using weak Pareto again, wP (f(R′))z. Station-
arity implies
yP (f(R′))x. (10)








for all t ∈ N \ {1} which, by independence of irrelevant alternatives, requires that
xf(R)y ⇔ xf(R′)y,
contradicting the conjunction of (9) and (10).
Yet another impossibility emerges if Pareto indifference is used instead of independence
of irrelevant alternatives. Pareto indifference is the analogue of weak Pareto that is
obtained by replacing each occurrence of a strict preference with an indifference.
Pareto indifference. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ D,
xI(Rt)y for all t ∈ N ⇒ xI(f(R))y.
Replacing independence of irrelevant alternatives with Pareto indifference leaves the in-
compatibility stated in the previous theorem intact, as shown by Bossert and Suzumura
(2011).
Theorem 8 (Bossert and Suzumura, 2011) There exists no collective choice rule f
that satisfies selfish domain, weak Pareto, Pareto indifference and classical stationarity.
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Proof. Suppose f is a collective choice rule that satisfies the axioms of the theorem
statement. Let x, y, z ∈ X.
For each odd t ∈ N, let t be an ordering on X such that
zP (t)x and xI(t)y.
For each even t ∈ N, let t be an ordering on X such that
zI(t)x and xP (t)y.
Define a profile R as follows. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all t ∈ N, let
xRty ⇔ xt t yt.
Clearly, the profile thus defined is in R∞S .
Now consider the streams
x = (z, z, x, z, x, z, x, . . .);
y = (z, x, y, x, y, x, y, . . .);
z = (z, x, z, x, z, x, . . .) = x≥2;
w = (x, y, x, y, x, y, . . .) = y≥2.
We have xI(Rt)y for all t ∈ N and, by Pareto indifference, xI(f(R))y. Stationarity
implies zI(f(R))w. But zP (Rt)w for all t ∈ N, and we obtain a contradiction to weak
Pareto.
The two theorems just established suggest that the selfish domain assumption can only
yield satisfactory possibilities if the classical stationary assumption is amended as well.
There is a plausible alternative version according to which the (common) first-period
component is eliminated not only from the streams to be compared but also from the
profile for which the social ranking is to be determined. This axiom, which appears to be
suitable in conjunction with the path chosen by focusing on selfish preferences, is due to
Bossert and Suzumura (2011).
Multi-profile stationarity. For all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ D, if x1 = y1, then
xf(R)y ⇔ x≥2f(R≥2)y≥2.
If multi-profile stationarity is used instead of classical stationarity, a possibility results
if both independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto indifference are added to the
list of axioms to be satisfied. Moreover, a characterization can be obtained in this case.
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The chronological dictatorship is the social welfare function f defined by letting, for
all x,y ∈ X∞ and for all R ∈ R∞S , xf(R)y if and only if
[xτI(τ )yτ for all τ ∈ N] or
[there exists t ∈ N such that xτI(τ )yτ for all τ < t and xtP (t)yt].
The chronological dictatorship is, evidently, a special case of a dictatorial social welfare
function and, thus, it turns out that the two alternative paths towards a resolution of
Ferejohn and Page’s (1978) impossibility lead to similar results. Both Packel’s (1980)
approach based on stationary individual preferences and Bossert and Suzumura’s (2011)
attempt to use selfish individual preferences in conjunction with a new version of station-
arity allow for the existence of social welfare functions with the desired properties. But,
due to the bias in favor of generation one that is imposed by either form of stationarity
(in conjunction with the unidirectional nature of the flow of time), the resulting rules
must be dictatorial with generation one being the dictator. We conclude this survey with
a statement and proof sketch of Bossert and Suzumura’s (2011) characterization.
Theorem 9 (Bossert and Suzumura, 2011) A social welfare function f satisfies self-
ish domain, weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, Pareto indifference and
multi-profile stationarity if and only if f is the chronological dictatorship.
Sketch of proof. That the chronological dictatorship satisfies the axioms of the theorem
statement is straightforward to verify.
In order to prove the reverse implication, a version of Hansson’s (1976) theorem that
applies to the selfish domain needs to be established, as is the case for Theorem 5. How-
ever, in the selfish case, Pareto indifference is required as an additional axiom. A mod-
ification of this nature is called for because the selfish domain is not sufficiently rich to
generate arbitrary rankings of all streams. For example, whenever we have two streams
x and y such that xt = yt for some selfish generation t ∈ N, this selfish generation must
declare x and y indifferent; this is an immediate consequence of the conjunction of selfish
domain and reflexivity. This addition of Pareto indifference to the list of axioms is neces-
sitated by the observation that a fundamental preliminary result—an adaptation of Sen’s
(1995, p.4) field expansion lemma to our selfish domain setting—fails to be true if merely
selfish domain, weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives are imposed.
Loosely speaking, the field expansion lemma establishes that a decisiveness property over
a given pair of alternatives can be expanded to all pairs of alternatives, thus producing
full decisiveness from a weaker version that is restricted to a pair.
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The proof of Theorem 9 consists of the following steps.
First, a version of the field expansion lemma for the selfish domain is proven, pro-
vided that f satisfies weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto
indifference.
In a second step, this result is used to establish a version of Hansson’s (1976) ultrafilter
theorem that applies to the selfish domain. Again, Pareto indifference is required in order
to invoke the above-described variant of the field expansion lemma.
The third step consists of showing that the axioms imply that generation one must be
a dictator for f . This step parallels the corresponding step in the proofs of Theorems 2
and 5, except that multi-profile stationarity is used instead of classical stationarity.
Finally, the observation that generation one is a dictator is used to show that only
the chronological dictatorship satisfies the required axioms. Because the proof method
employed in this step does not appear in any of the proofs outlined earlier, we provide
the details.
Because f is assumed to be a social welfare function (and, thus, produces social order-
ings for all profiles in its domain), it is sufficient to show that, for all x,y ∈ X∞ and for
all R ∈ R∞S , xP (f(R))y whenever x is strictly preferred to y according to the chronolog-
ical dictatorship (the corresponding implication involving indifference is trivially satisfied
because of Pareto indifference).
Suppose t ∈ N, x,y ∈ X∞ and R ∈ R∞S are such that
xτI(τ )yτ for all τ < t and xtP (t)yt.
If t = 1, let z = y; if t ≥ 2, let z = (x1, . . . , xt−1,y≥t). By Pareto indifference, yI(f(R))z.
Transitivity implies
xf(R)y ⇔ xf(R)z.
Together with the application of multi-profile stationarity t − 1 times and noting that
z≥t = y≥t, we obtain
xf(R)y ⇔ xf(R)z ⇔ x≥tf(R≥t)z≥t ⇔ x≥tf(R≥t)y≥t. (11)
Because generation one is a dictator for f as established in the previous step, the relative
ranking of x≥t and y≥t according to R≥t is determined by the strict preference for x over
y according to the first generation in the profile R≥t (which is generation t in R), so that
x≥tP (f(R≥t))y≥t and, by (11), xP (f(R))y.
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